Abstract
backend server must perform a linear search of its database to identify and authenticate a tag. That is to say, for each tag entry in the database in turn, it computes the lightweight cryptographic function that would be produced by that tag and compares it with the received authentication application. Such a linear search runs in O(n) time, where n is the number of elements in the backend database. Such a costly search function will potentially cause scalability issues as the tag population increases [5] .
The main contribution of this paper is to propose an efficient lightweight RFID mutual authentication protocol. This protocol only requires O(1) work to identify and authenticate a tag in the backend server. In addition, this protocol is particularly suitable for the low-cost RFID systems because only one-way hash function, XOR operation and concatenation operation are needed in tags.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the second section, security and performance requirements for RFID authentication protocols design are generalized. In the third section, the related research work especially Hsap is introduced. In the forth section, a new efficient lightweight RFID authentication protocol is proposed. In the fifth section, security properties and performance of the proposed protocol are analyzed and compared with the related RFID authentication protocols based on static ID mechanism. Finally, the conclusion of this paper is provided in the sixth section.
Security and performance requirements for RFID protocols

Security
Based on the special characters like non-physical contact, asymmetry between the forward channel and the backward channel, etc. RFID systems are confronted with many kinds of security threats as follows:
1) Tag untraceability If responding message from a tag always contains a changeless value, namely the response are linkable to each other or distinguishable from those of other tags, an adversary can recognize and locate the tag by intercepting and analyzing. That is to say, the location privacy of the user (human being, or animal, or article) that attached by the tag could be traced.
2) Tag information protection A tag is always attached to an article, or a human being, or an animal, so through all the authentication access, an illegimate user should not acquire the legimate holder"s detailed information.
3) Spoofing attack An adversary could feign a legitimate tag and communicate with a reader instead of the tag and be authenticated as the tag but the genuine legitimate tag may be out simultaneously. 4) Replay attack Such an attack in which an adversary repeatedly launches a message that obtained by eavesdropping or intercepting from a regular communication between a reader and a tag during a normal authentication access.
5) Denial of Service (DoS) attack An adversary disturbs the communications between a reader and a tag by means of intercepting or blocking messages transmitted, that could cause losing synchronization between the backend server and the tag, so the legitimate tag cannot be authenticated by the backend server again. 6) Forward security If an adversary obtain all the secrets that stored in a tag, the information sent in past by the tag should be secure despite the exposure of these secrets [6] .
Performance
RFID schemes cannot use computationally intensive cryptographic algorithms to provide privacy and security because constraint limited resources on tag side. RFID schemes should address the following performance issues [7] .
Storage cost: The volume of data stored in a tag should be minimally controlled.
Computation cost: The computation complexity and intensity of a tag should be minimally controlled.
Traffic cost: The communication rounds between three parties (Tag, Reader, Backend server) should be controlled; the volume of messages exchanged between a tag and a reader should be minimally controlled.
Backend server workload: The backend server should have the ability of handling growing and huge amounts of tags. In each authentication access, the backend server should escape performing the exhaustive linear search (record-by-record lightweight cryptographic calculation) to find the matching item, so well scalability is an important request for RFID systems.
Especially, there is no universal applicable solution for RFID systems, the security levels would depend on specific application. That is to say, RFID systems should attain balanced target between security and performance. The research object of RFID authentication protocols is using less resources to satisfy the same security requirements or achieving higher security levels by using the equal resources.
Related work
Presently, for the reason of convenient using and cost, lightweight methods like Hash, PRNG and CRC are used wildly in design of RFID authentication protocols. Especially, hash-based protocols have been researched actively.
According to whether the backend server and a tag update the identifier or not in an entire authentication access, RFID authentication protocols are divided into dynamic ID mechanism and static ID mechanism. Static ID mechanism is always used in the circumstance that the ownership of an ID is not needed to transfer. Our research work in this paper is mainly based on static ID mechanism.
Many RFID authentication protocols based on static ID mechanism have been proposed recently. Sarma et al. proposed Hash-Lock protocol [8] The authentication access of Hsap: Phase1: The reader generates a random number r R and sends a query with r R to tags.
An Efficient Lightweight RFID Authentication Protocol for Low-cost Tags He Jialiang, Ouyang Dantong, Ye Yuxin Phase2: After receiving r R , a tag would generate a random number r T and calculate H L (ID‖r R ‖r T ), then send H L (ID‖r R ‖r T ) and r T back to the reader. Phase3: After receiving H L (ID‖r R ‖r T ) and r T from the tag, the reader would send H L (ID‖r R ‖r T ), r T , r R to the backend server.
Phase4: After receiving H L (ID‖r R ‖r T ), r T , r R from the reader, the backend server would search whether there exists certain ID* that could make H L (ID*‖r R ‖r T ) = H L (ID‖r R ‖r T ). If exists, the tag would be considered as a legitimate tag, then the backend server would calculate H R (ID‖r T ), subsequently sends H R (ID‖r T ) and Info to the reader. If not exists, the authentication is failed, failure information would be sent to the reader. Phase5: After receiving H R (ID‖r T ) and Info from the backend server, the reader would store Info in its memory and send H R (ID‖r T ) to the tag. After receiving H R (ID‖r T ) from the reader, the tag would calculate H R (ID‖r T ), If the calculation outcome equals to the received value, then the object of mutual authentication achieves, otherwise, the authentication is failed.
Hsap is a simple and clear RFID authentication protocol that can satisfy common security requirements, however, there are some problems of security and performance as follows:
1) In the phase4, the backend server would search whether there exists certain ID* that could make H L (ID*‖r R ‖r T ) = H L (ID‖r R ‖r T ), the backend server must perform the exhaustive linear search (record-by-record hash function calculation) to find the matching ID*. In each authentication access, the backend server averagely performs (n+1)/2 times hash operations to verify and authenticate a tag. Such a linear search runs in O(n) time, where n is the number of elements in the database. Such a costly search function would potentially cause scalability issues as the amount of tags increases enormously.
2) In the phase4, the backend server would calculate H R (ID‖r T ) , and forward it to the tag through the reader. In the message H R (ID‖r T ), r T has lost the relation with r R . If the tag is only in single protocol authentication environment, it has no problem; however, if the tag is in multiple protocols authentication environment, it would lead to confusion.
3) Passive tags have constraint requirements of limited resources, using less hardware cost is an important research object. We can see that using pseudo random number generator in tags leads to extra hardware cost in Hsap, so Hsap is not suitable for low-cost RFID systems very well [14] . 
Assumptions
1) The channel between the backend server and a reader is assumed secure. On the other hand, the channel between a reader and a tag is assumed insecure.
2) The resources of each passive tag are constrained. In this protocol, each tag only needs to have a one-way hash function H( ), XOR operation capability and concatenation operation capability.
3) A tag is not vulnerable to compromised with an adversary, that is to say, the adversary cannot acquire the inner information of the tag.
4) The one-way hash function H( ) is secure enough agaist brute exhaustive search from an adversary.
Initialization phase
In this phase, the backend server and tags should store information required to perform authentication. The backend server initially stores ID and Info of each tag in its database. ID and T 0 (initial value may be "0") would be stored in each tag.
The (i +1)th authentication access
Process of the proposed protocol is shown in Fig 2: After receiving β and Info from the backend server, the reader would store Info in its memory and send β to the tag. After receiving β from the reader, the tag should calculate H R (M L ‖R ‖ID), If the calculation outcome equals to β, then the object of mutual authentication achieves, otherwise, the authentication is failed.
Analysis
Security analysis
We would analyze this protocol to evaluate whether it meets the security requirements as follows: 1) Tag untraceability An adversary could eavesdrop the response message (H(M L ‖R)⊕ID, M L ) from a tag, and analyze the information carefully and try to detect the user"s location privacy by tracking the tag. Because the tag generates a new substituted random number M = H(T⊕R⊕ID) during each authentication access, and updates T i+1 = M⊕(H(M L ‖R)⊕ID) in the phase2, so the adversary cannot differentiate which tag does the response from the message (H(M L ‖R)⊕ID, M L ). So this protocol can meet tag untraceability.
2) Tag information protection Because the information of an ID (Info) is stored in the backend server and is transmitted through the secure channel from the backend server to the reader, an adversary cannot acquire the information of the ID. So this protocol can meet tag information protection.
3) Spoofing attack An adversary feigns a legitimate reader which sends a query with R to tags through the forward channel, and obtains the response of a tag (H(M L ‖R)⊕ID, M L ). In the next authentication access, when a legitimate reader sends a query with R', the adversary feigns the tag and responds the legitimate reader with the obtained message (H(M L ‖R)⊕ID, M L ) through the backward channel. However, the reader generates a new random number during each authentication access, that is to say, R≠R', so the adversary cannot perform tag impersonation attack.
4) Replay attack
Replay attack can be prevented in this protocol due to the message transmitted for each access is different. Different value of H(M L ‖R) is utilized in individual access and T that stored in a tag plays a key role in providing different value of H(M L ‖R) to conceal ID of the tag. An adversary cannot acquire H() so as to calculate H(M L ‖R), so it is impossible for the adversary to perform replay attack.
5) Denial of Service (DoS) attack As the ID of a tag is fixed, even if loss of message, power failure or loss of connection with the backend server happens during an authentication access, it would not affect the backend server, namely it would not lose the synchronization between the backend server and the tag, only resetting a new authentication access is well, so this protocol can shield DoS attack well. 6) Forward security This protocol is based on static ID mechanism, the ID stored in the backend server and a tag would not be updated in an authentication access, so this protocol is not satisfy forward security completely. Table 2 indicates a comparison of results among our protocol and related RFID authentication protocols based on static ID mechanism in terms of security.
Performance evaluations
We would make performance evaluations of this protocol as follows: Storage cost: each tag only stores ID and temporary value T in its memory. So this protocol can meet the storage constraints in a low-cost RFID environment.
Computation cost: in RFID systems, the main limits of the computational ability lie on the tags. In this protocol, only one-way hash function, XOR operation and concatenation operation are needed in tags, without pseudo random number generator used for the reason of hardware cost, so this protocol has low computation cost An Efficient Lightweight RFID Authentication Protocol for Low-cost Tags He Jialiang, Ouyang Dantong, Ye Yuxin Traffic cost: this protocol requires five rounds to perform an authentication access. In addition, by transmitting half of the information in the phase2 and the phase5, it could improve the efficiency of the transmission and economize the communication cost.
Backend server workload: In the backend server, only one time hash operation is needed for verifying and authenticating a tag. The backend server performs a constant time search to find the match item in its database, it would alleviate workload of the backend server sharply, so this protocol has well scalability and is suitable to managing large population of tags. Table 3 indicates a comparison of results among our protocol and related RFID authentication protocols based on static ID mechanism in terms of performance. 
"O" denotes satisfied, "X" denotes not satisfied 'l' is the length of ID and H(), "r" is the operation of generating random, "n" is the amount of tags in the backend server, "H" denotes one-way hash operation, "P" denotes pseudo random number generator.
Conclusion
RFID systems suffer from many privacy and security problems, and scalability becomes an important requirement gradually. Therefore, in this paper, a novel efficient lightweight RFID mutual authentication protocol is proposed, this protocol only requires O(1) work to identify and authenticate a tag in the backend server, it would alleviate workload of the backend server sharply, so this protocol has well scalability. The careful security analysis shows that this protocol can resist spoofing attack, replay attack, DoS attack, meet tag untraceability and tag information protection; the performance evaluations show that this protocol is suitable for low-cost RFID systems very well. The next work we should do is designing an efficient lightweight RFID mutual authentication protocol based on dynamic ID mechanism in the future.
